Sure, for some the Internet of Things is just an opportunity to make money. But what if it's also an opportunity to share our expertise - and in the process, make the world a better place?
Is the elliptical curve cryptographic algorithm (ECDSA) a viable crypto algorithm for use in DNSSEC today? And what has changed over the last two years?
In 2016, IPv4 exhaustion is on everyone’s lips: four out of five Regional Internet Registries have run out of freely available address space.
Comparisons rarely work. They never fit properly; they almost always lead away from the topic. And the audience‘s attention is lost in unimportant details. Therefore, writers do themselves few favours when they use comparisons as stylistic tools. I once read that in a book about speech writing (Franz, 2015). But there is one exception: the remote comparison. The further away the object of comparison, the better. The remote comparison is intended to show how absurd a situation is. The market at the core of the Internet is like a movie without a title.
The Dutch Network Operators Group had its annual conference on 9 September 2016, in Amsterdam. Here are some impressions of the event.
We started using RIPE Atlas to monitor and improve the services to our customers. We liked it so much that we're now a sponsor!
We are updating the technology behind RIPE Labs and www.ripe.net. If you are a frequent RIPE Labs editor, you will discover some great new features! At the same time, we also documented our experiences with upgrading to the new version to provide feedback to the Plone community.
We announced earlier that the RIPE Atlas APIs will change around the end of the year. In this article we give some advice on how to make this transition.
How we compare connectivity of cloud services using RIPE Atlas latency and DNS measurements
In July, I was fortunate enough to attend the third Indonesia Network Operators Group conference, IDNOG 3, which was held in Jakarta.
We take another, more detailed look at probe lifetimes and the dynamics of probes connecting and disconnecting from the RIPE Atlas infrastructure to try to understand how to keep the network growing in the long term.
The RIPE NCC is hosting a hackathon focused on developing tools for Internet Exchange Points. Come participate!
Until now, native IPv4 and IPv6 has been one of the conditions of hosting a RIPE Atlas anchor. However, we realise that IPv6 simply isn't available in some would-be anchor hosts' ASNs. As a result, we've decided to support IPv4-only anchors.
traIXroute is a tool that detects whether and where a traceroute path crosses an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). It uses data from multiple sources and advanced criteria to verify IXP crossings to deal with problems due to replies from third-party interfaces or inaccuracies in the available data about IP addresses assigned to IXPs. These problems can mislead simple heuristics, based solely on the IP address prefixes allocated to IXPs, for the inference of IXP crossings.
We continue to look at failure rates for RIPE Atlas version 3 probes and the possible causes.
EuroSSIG 2016, held in Meissen, Germany from 16-23 July, gathered 30 fellows and 30 faculty members together for an intensive week-long introduction to the topic of Internet governance. This was also the year it celebrated its 10th anniversary. The RIPE NCC, which is one of many sponsors, sent two staff as fellows and one faculty member. Below are some impressions.
I've been a faculty member at EuroSSIG, the European Summer School on Internet Governance, since 2013. Below are my impressions on my experiences during that time, along with what makes EuroSSIG so unique.
With the attempted coup in Turkey, reports went out about social media being throttled and/or blocked. We analysed data about this that we collected with RIPE Atlas and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).
The DNS is normally a relatively open protocol that smears its data (which is your data and mine too!) far and wide. Little wonder that the DNS is used in many ways, not just as a mundane name resolution protocol, but as a data channel for surveillance and as a common means of implementing various forms of content access control. But all this is poised to change. Now that the Snowden files have sensitized us to the level of such activities, we have become acutely aware that many of our tools are just way too trusting, way too chatty, and way too easily subverted. First and foremost in this collection of vulnerable tools is the Domain Name System.
Following my recent research on DNS hijacking and the cases I have personally observed, I wondered whether this is a common practice among the operators. With the help of RIPE Atlas, I started to think of a solution to figure out whether such practice is widespread in other areas of the world.