
The Resilience of the Internet in Ukraine
• 11 min read
We look at the structure of the Internet in Ukraine and how it may be helping the country stay connected.
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Oleksiy ("Alex") is a Technical Advisor and an External Relations Officer for the RIPE NCC (Eastern Europe and Central Asia). As part of the External Relations team, he helps lead the RIPE NCC's engagement with membership, the RIPE community, technical bodies, academia, law enforcement and other Internet stakeholders. As Technical Advisor, Alex also follows Internet industry and government developments related to ICT, particularly in the former Soviet countries, monitors and attends industry conferences and meetings, representing the RIPE NCC there, and works with internal stakeholders to enhance the RIPE NCC's training activities. He is currently the Chair of ENOG Programming Committee. Prior to his role at the RIPE NCC, Alex worked as COO at Qrator Labs where he worked on providing DDoS mitigating solutions. Before that, he worked for Yandex Russia, supervising all network projects as the Head of Network Development and Operations. His professional background includes work in engineering positions at Ratmir holding, the Russian branch of Deutsche Bank, and telecoms such as Cronyx Plus and Megafon, participating in projects designing the internal and external network infrastructure, building multipurpose data centres and creating layered security systems. Alex has spoken and presented at many international events as an expert in the design and security of data networks and data centres. Alex studied Chemistry at the Moscow State University, graduating in 1994 with honours.

• 11 min read
We look at the structure of the Internet in Ukraine and how it may be helping the country stay connected.
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The statement "BGP does not accept prefixes more specific than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6" is not correct. BGP as a protocol perfectly accepts anything more specific, but in the global network they should be filtered out. However people quite often use exactly announcements of /32 and /128 for blackholing when it is agreed with neighbours. Now, if you want to blackhole 3FFF:1234::4321, you announce 3FFF:1234::4321/128 with the corresponding NEXT HOP - and boom, RPKI made this announcement invalid because of max-length, nothing is blackholed. So I am 99% sure that pdxnet.uk uses these ROAs to enable their blackholing announcements, and most probably they are automatically generated, not managed manually.
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