Anna Maria Mandalari

How Consumer IoT Devices Expose Information

Anna Maria Mandalari
Contributors: Jingjing Ren, Daniel J. Dubois, David Choffnes, Roman Kolcun, Hamed Haddadi
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Do our Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices at home expose private information unexpectedly? Do leaks of sensitive user data depend on the location and jurisdiction of the IoT device? Through a total of 34,586 rigorous automated and manual controlled experiments, we characterised information exposure from 81 devices located in two different countries: US and UK.

Why does this matter?

Worldwide there are an estimated 7 billion IoT devices connected to the Internet, and this number is expected to double in the next 2 years. These devices are deployed nearly everywhere, from public spaces, to our workplaces, and even in the most private areas of our homes. Typically, home IoT devices are exposed to or have access to sensitive, personal, and private information. For instance, smart speakers may listen to private conversations, doorbells or security cameras may record residents and guests without their knowledge or consent, and televisions may track our viewing habits. It’s not just that these devices are exposed to sensitive information, it’s also due to the “I” in IoT: all such devices can access the Internet and potentially share this type of information. In this work, we focus on a number of questions:

  • Where does the Internet traffic of IoT devices go to?
  • Is such traffic protected from eavesdroppers via encryption?
  • What are the potential privacy implications of this exposure?

Below is a summary of the findings from our research paper, which was presented at the ACM IMC 2019 conference in Amsterdam (also see Impressions from IMC 2019).

Measuring IoT privacy

IoT devices are very different from other devices, such as mobile phones. There are no standard simulation tools or emulation or testbeds for testing them. For this reason, we deploy d two twin testbeds in two regions. We also developed software (and made it publicly available) for automatically interacting with devices and collecting Internet traffic. The first testbed, the Mon(IoT)r Lab, was built at Northeastern University (US). It is designed to resemble a real studio flat where participants in a user study can access and interact with the IoT devices freely. In order to understand if the devices behave in the same way in another region with different privacy regulations, we set up a second testbed in the Imperial College (UK) with a similar set of IoT devices. We selected the devices among many categories and we bought those most popular on the market at the moment - a total of 81 devices (cameras, smart hubs, televisions, smart fridge etc.).

Figure 1: US and UK IoT labs, configured like a studio apartment that contains a large set of consumer IoT devices

We designed experiments for emulating the usage of the devices, in particular we considered:

Controlled interactions: By using the companion app or the companion smart speaker we automatically controlled the devices (i.e. switching on the light, streaming video, triggering motions etc.). Idle: We collected the traffic when the device was on but there is no interaction with it. Uncontrolled interactions: We recruited 36 participants that used the devices as they saw fit for 6 months. We repeated the controlled experiments 30 times for a total of 34,586 experiments. Our monitoring software captured all packets the devices were sending/receiving to the Internet and organised the results per device and per experiment. 

Where is your data going?

We focused on the following: 

  • Which parties do the IoT devices contact?
  • What is their geolocation?
  • What are the most common non-first parties contacted?

A destination can be classified as:

  • First party: Manufacturer of the IoT device or a related company responsible for fulfilling the device's functionality.
  • Support party: Any company providing outsourced computing resources, such as CDN and cloud providers.
  • Third party: Any party that is not a first or support party. This includes advertising and analytics companies.
Organisation US
(46 devices)
(35 devices)
US Common
(24 devices)
UK Common
(24 devices)
Amazon 31 24 16 17
Google 14 9 10 8
Akamai 10 6 6 5
Microsoft 6 4 1 1
Netflix 4 2 3 2
Kingsoft 3 3 1 1
21Vianet 3 3 1 1
Alibaba 3 4 2 2
Beijing Huaxiay 3 3 1 1
AT&T 2 0 1 1
Table 1: Organisations contacted by multiple devices


In order to characterise destinations we tried to find the Second-Level Domain (SLD), by looking at DNS responses, HTTP headers or TLS handshake and then retried the organisation by using public databases (i.e. the Whois database). We also collected all the IP addresses from the network traffic and we retried the organisation that holds the IP address.

For geolocating the IP addresses we used RIPE IP Map and Passport. Results show that many devices contact Amazon and CDN providers as expected. We also noted that nearly all TVs or dongles contact Netflix without actually using Netflix or being logged in to Netflix. We also noticed that they contact cloud providers outside the boundary of the device's privacy jurisdiction (i.e. Chinese cloud providers). Our results demonstrate that devices change behaviour in different regions, but we couldn’t identify a simple or clear explanation for this behaviour. We then identified the countries contacted and we show the results by grouping the traffic by categories. The Sankey diagram in Figure 2 shows that most of the traffic is produced by cameras and televisions, and most devices contact privacy jurisdictions outside of the testbeds, particularly from the UK.

Figure 2: Volume of network traffic between the US (left) and UK (right) labs to the top seven destination regions (center), grouped by category (middle left and right)


Unencrypted information leakage

As a next step we characterised the content sent by the IoT devices. We checked for unencrypted content and evidence of privacy exposure. We found that some devices (Samsung fridge, Instead hub, and magic home LED) expose the MAC address (a unique identifier) unencrypted. Interestingly, each time the Xiaomi camera detected motion, its MAC address, the hour, and the date of the motion (in plaintext) were sent to an Amazon EC2 domain. We also noted that an image was included in the payload. We finally noted other unencrypted content, like firmware updates and metadata pertaining to initial device set up.

Figure 3: Some IoT devices exposing Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

How much of the traffic is encrypted?


Figure 4: Percentage of unencrypted (red) and encrypted (green) traffic by device category

Fortunately, our study didn't produce only bad news! When analysing the traffic, we found that the amount of unencrypted traffic is quite small (see red bar in Figure 4).

Can we infer user activity from network traffic?

Even if most IoT traffic is not plaintext, we wondered if it would still be possible for eavesdroppers to detect user activity based on encrypted/encoded network traffic patterns. More specifically, is it possible to understand how and when users interact with IoT devices, and which device functionality has been used (e.g. turning on/off a light)? We collected traffic patterns resulting from controlled device interactions and we then looked for similar patterns using supervised machine learning. We tried several machine learning approaches and we ended up with the Random Forest Tree Classifier. As features we used packets size, inter-arrival time etc.

Figure 5: Percentage of inferable devices by activity


Figure 5 shows that significant amounts of device activities are inferable, particularly video or voice activities. Inferable activities can be exploited by eavesdroppers (e.g. ISPs or cloud providers) to understand what devices users have, when they are present in their homes, and what they are doing in their homes. Inferring device activities opens up another important capability: if we can identify what a device is doing, we can determine whether it takes certain actions (e.g. recording a video) unexpectedly.

Does a device expose information unexpectedly?

We define unexpected behaviour as cases when a device generates network traffic corresponding to an interaction that was not triggered by an experiment, or if it was not intended by the user.

Figure 6: Methodology for inferring activities


We focused on uncontrolled and idle experiments, and we found several unexpected behaviours. Some popular video doorbells have the capability to detect motion, and we found that the devices record a video of whoever triggered motion detection - both without notifying the person being recorded (except for a notification in the app of the device owner) and without a way to disable the feature. Several televisions contact Netflix, Google or Facebook on a regular basis, even when these services were not used.

We also noted that some smart speakers, like Alexa enabled devices, frequently record audio when the wake word is not spoken. As an example, Alexa devices wake up when a sentence beginning with “I like [s-word]” is spoken. We also found that even when there is no motion or activity in the room, some cameras false trigger motion and record, and many devices spuriously restarted.

A call for caution and transparency

Our study was the first to quantify information exposure across different networks, geographic regions, and interactions with devices. We found a number of behaviors that should make consumers think carefully when considering deploying such devices in their homes. Further, we found that there is a need to provide greater transparency when it comes to IoT device behaviour, so they can better identify unexpected and unwanted data transmission, and take appropriate action.

Some of our key findings include:

  • More than 50% of destinations contacted by the IoT devices are non-first parties.
  • 56% of the devices in US and 84% in UK contact at least one destination abroad.
  • Many devices (89%) are vulnerable to at least one activity inference that can be use to identify unexpected activities.

Our study is a first step toward understanding information exposure by consumer IoT devices at scale. To facilitate analysis and reproducibility in the broader research community, our experiment infrastructure, code, and data are publicly available at While our initial study has only scratched the surface, stay tuned for follow-up work that provides deeper insights into unexpected behaviour from IoT devices and shows how to control information exposure from them.

Anna Maria was a RACI fellow at RIPE 79 and presented her research during the IoT WG at RIPE 79.

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About the author

Anna Maria Mandalari Based in London

Anna Maria Mandalari works as research associate in the Dyson School of Design Engineering at the Faculty of Engineering at Imperial College London. Over the last four years she was a METRICS Marie Curie Early Stage Researcher affiliated with the University Carlos III of Madrid (UC3M). Her research interests are related to IoT, privacy, large-scale Internet measurements, Internet measurement platforms, middleboxes and new Internet protocols.

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