In July 2010 we looked at the effects of BGP route origin validation on mis-announcements and hijackings. In the meantime, we did some research based on comments and questions received by the community. The findings are described in this follow-up article.
Let's take a look at how the number of different RIPE DB objects changed in the last nine years. Many of the graphs are easy to understand, but some of them are not trivial.
Back in December 2009 we released a tool with which you can test your DNS resolver for possible issues with a DNSSEC signed root zone. Now that the root zone has been signed in production since 15 July 2010 we will stop this service on Monday, 11 October 2010.
After the DNS root zone was finally signed and a number of TLDs began signing their zones, we were curious to see how many clients actually request DNSSEC information. First we looked at our server that provides secondary service to several ccTLDs.
On 27 August 2010, the RIPE NCC's Routing Information Service (RIS) was involved in an experiment using optional attributes in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). As a result of this experiment, a small, but significant percentage of global Internet traffic was disrupted for a period of about 30 minutes. The following article provides some background information on the experiment itself and its effect on the network.