The prefix 128.0/16 is filtered in Juniper devices up to and including JUNOS software version 11.1. We looked at three ways to get a rough estimate on how much filtering of 128.0/16 is going on on the Internet.
During RIPE 63 in Vienna, a few of us got together and started downloading, compiling and configuring the RPKI daemon. I now set up two routers which I made publicly available. The details are described in this article.
In this article we describe how we use RIPE Atlas to determine which instance of a name server a probe uses.
This article describes a technical design for the introduction of abuse contact details in the RIPE Database and streamlining the general approach to handling contact details.
The introduction of a second IP protocol into the Internet presents many technical issues, and in previous columns we've explored many of the issues related to network engineering and infrastructure. In this column I'd like to head upward in the protocol stack to the rarefied air way up there at the level of the application, and look at how applications are managing to cope with the issue of two IP stacks.
Often when looking at IPv6 deployment statistics, the size of the organisation or the network is not taken into account. In this article, we look at IPv6 deployment of Local Internet Registries (LIRs) per country in correlation with the size of the LIR.
In this article we look at two "Happy Eyeballs" implementations, that aim to reduce degraded user experience as the result of broken dual-stack configurations. We call this degraded user experience "Unhappy Eyeballs". The Chrome web browser implementation seems to succeed in this aim, while Apple's Mac OS X Lion operating system only partially succeeds in avoiding "Unhappy Eyeballs". Furthermore we show that Mac OS X Lion, in combination with the Safari web browser results in "Happy Eyeballs", but leaves well performing native IPv6 capacity unused in roughly half of the cases we measured, a condition we name "Hampering Eyeballs".
In this article we suggest a technical solution to the issue of publicly displaying MD5 password hashes in the RIPE Database.
Passwords are the most used authentication method in the RIPE Database. This mechanism has two major design problems. The MD5 hash is public, when running a single query (not for bulk queries). And in case of email updates, plain text passwords are sent by email to update the database. Find below some recommendations on how to secure your objects until these issues have been addressed.