Matthias Wählisch

Based in Berlin, Germany




Likes on articles

About the author

Matthias is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Freie Universität Berlin, heading the Internet technologies lab. His research and teaching focus on efficient, reliable, and secure Internet communication. This includes the design and evaluation of networking protocols and architectures, as well as Internet measurements and analysis. His efforts are driven by the hope of improving Internet communication based on sound research. He is actively involved in the IETF since 2005, co-founded some successful open source projects such as RIOT ( and RTRlib (, and is a member of the Board of Advisors of BCIX.

Should You Update Your Route Flap Damping Parameters?

BGP Route Flap Damping (RFD) is recommended to suppress BGP churn. Default RFD configurations in routers have been shown to be harmful. Current configuration recommendations by the IETF and RIPE, however, are based on a study from 2010 which focused on IPv4 only. This article presents our recent me…

Article tags:

20 You have liked this article 0 times.

Route Flap Damping in the Wild?!

BGP Route Flap Damping (RFD) and its use has been a controversial topic in the past. Recommendations have been revised multiple times over the past two decades and still differ from vendor default values. In this article we dive into how we measured Route Flap Damping in the real-world, uncover whi…

Article tags:

24 You have liked this article 0 times.

Down the Black Hole: Dismantling Operational Practices of BGP Blackholing at IXPs

Large Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks pose a major threat not only to end systems but also to the Internet infrastructure as a whole. Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering (RTBH) has been established as a tool to mitigate inter-domain DDoS attacks. The idea is simple: Signal special BG…

Article tags:

10 You have liked this article 0 times.

Measuring the Adoption of RPKI Route Origin Validation

The number of Resource Certificates and ROAs is steadily growing, especially in the RIPE NCC service region. However, it remains unclear how widely BGP speakers on the Internet are actually using route origin validation (ROV) to drop or de-preference invalid announcements.

Article tags:

4 You have liked this article 0 times.

Showing 5 article(s)