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Randy Bush is a Research Fellow and Network Operator at Internet Initiative Japan, Japan's first commercial ISP. He specializes in network measurement especially routing, network security, routing protocols, and IPv6 deployment. He is also a lead designer of the BGP security effort. Randy has been in computing for over 50 years, and has a few decades of Internet operations experience. He was the engineering founder of Verio, which is now NTT/Verio. He has been heavily involved in transferring Internet technologies to developing economies for over 25 years. He was a chair of the IETF WG on the DNS for a decade and served as a member of the IESG, as co-chair of the IETF Operations and Management Area. Randy was the first Chair of the NANOG Steering Committee, a co-founder of AfNOG, on the founding Board of Directors of ARIN, helped start AfriNIC, and has participated in APNIC, RIPE, et alia since each was founded. see http://archive.psg.com/papers.html
Website: https://psg.com/~randy
• 10 min read
The RIPE community has always aimed to foster an open, supportive atmosphere across its events and communication fora. The RIPE Code of Conduct helps make clear which behaviours cultivate that, and which don't. Here, the RIPE Code of Conduct Team talk about the work they do to help uphold RIPE comm…
• 9 min read
BGP Route Flap Damping (RFD) is recommended to suppress BGP churn. Default RFD configurations in routers have been shown to be harmful. Current configuration recommendations by the IETF and RIPE, however, are based on a study from 2010 which focused on IPv4 only. This article presents our recent me…
• 9 min read
BGP Route Flap Damping (RFD) and its use has been a controversial topic in the past. Recommendations have been revised multiple times over the past two decades and still differ from vendor default values. In this article we dive into how we measured Route Flap Damping in the real-world, uncover whi…
• 10 min read
The number of Resource Certificates and ROAs is steadily growing, especially in the RIPE NCC service region. However, it remains unclear how widely BGP speakers on the Internet are actually using route origin validation (ROV) to drop or de-preference invalid announcements.
• 7 min read
This post describes a technique to detect bursty TCP disconnections, and how it can be used on RIPE Atlas data to better detect outages in the Internet.
• 9 min read
BGP routing table growth is one of the major Internet scaling issues, and prefix deaggregation is thought to be a major contributor to table growth. In this work we quantify the fragmentation of the routing table by the type of IP prefix. We observe that the proportion of deaggregated prefixes has …
• 8 min read
This article is intended to make RIPE Atlas users aware of ethical issues that could arise when using RIPE Atlas. We do not intend to propose any new formal processes or procedures to address the relevant ethical issues, but we do want to encourage members of the RIPE Atlas community to consider th…
• 11 min read
The issue of the relative sizes of the IPv4 and IPv6 Internet in BGP came up during discussion at the APNIC/APRICOT meeting held in Auckland, New Zealand earlier this year.
• 8 min read
Detecting network disruptions is a recurring problem. Clearly locating performance degradation is an important step in debugging and subsequently fixing connectivity issues.
• 11 min read
When operators and researchers use data from BGP route collectors such as RIS and Route Views, it's not easy to tell if a path announced to a collector is an ISP's customer cone, an internal route, or one learned from peering or transit. In this post we look at what information we can currently get…
Showing 10 article(s)
i would be actually concerned if this was being done by unnatural persons. having a wide and diverse bgp ecology seems in the interest of the internet. but what do i know?
nice piece. thanks. a few things: - personally, i much prefer signal - i use pgp email, but it sends a big signal that you may be doing something subversive - if you need to have a secure conversation with a friend, do not use electronic media. whisper in their ear in a noisy, moving, and crowded metro car.
really nice article. one bit could be made more clear. "IPv6 routers advertise link-local addresses to hosts" could be misread that fe80::1%eth0 will be advertised by some unspecified means, likely ND or even RA, to hosts on the LAN off of eth1 (which likely has its own fe80::1).
As the NSA, PLA, Mossad, GCHQ, ASD, ... are not in my threat model, at least not for RIPE meetings, Zoom is a fine choice. The ease of use is important, and we have no secrets. Luckily, neither of my employers tells me how to run my laptops.
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