The Internet has a robust infrastructure that was designed to route around damage. But how well does it do this? We use RIPE Atlas to look at how large-scale disruptions in the Internet's core infrastructure affect end-to-end connectivity on the Internet.
I'm a system architect at the RIPE NCC, where I work in the science group. I'm a chemist by training, but have been working since 1998 on Internet related things, as a sysadmin, security consultant, web developer and researcher. I am interested in technology changes (like IPv6 deployment), Internet measurement, data analysis, data visualization and security. When I'm not working I like to play electric guitar and run in circles, while listening to music.
Pages created by Emile Aben
When operators and researchers use data from BGP route collectors such as RIS and Route Views, it's not easy to tell if a path announced to a collector is an ISP's customer cone, an internal route, or one learned from peering or transit. In this post we look at what information we can currently get from BGP communities in RIS.
Dyn Research published an article on K-root recently. Here we would like to augment the picture with data from RIPE Atlas in order to provide a more complete picture of the effect of the K-root node in Iran.
This article describes our recent collaborations with France-IX on collecting data plane and control plane Internet data with RIPE Atlas and the RIPE NCC's Routing Information Service (RIS).
In October 2014 we started announcing a few longer-than-/24 prefixes and determined they were not very visible according to the Routing Information Service (RIS) and RIPE Atlas measurements. Now, almost a year later, we revisit this.